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This paper studies the nature and impact of credit constraints in the market for human capital. We
derive endogenous constraints from the design of government student loan programs and from the
limited repayment incentives in private lending markets. These constraints imply cross-sectional patterns
for schooling, ability, and family income that are consistent with U.S. data. This contrasts with the
standard exogenous constraint model, which predicts a counterfactual negative ability -- schooling
relationship for low-income youth. We show that the rising empirical importance of familial wealth
and income in determining college attendance (Belley and Lochner  2007) is consistent with increasingly
binding credit constraints in the face of rising tuition costs and returns to schooling. Our framework
also explains the recent increase in private credit for college as a market response to the rising returns
to school.
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Borrowing constraints have a long history in the literature on schooling and human capital
investment. Because human capital cannot be repossessed in response to default, it makes
for poor collateral. Since investing in human capital is most e±cient when individuals are
young, most students have not established a credit reputation or accumulated other forms
of collateral. As a result, private ¯nancial institutions have historically o®ered little credit
to ¯nance higher education.1 Even when governments have stepped in with public student
lending programs, the credit o®ered through these programs has been quite limited, and
credit constraints may still play an important role in higher education decisions.
As pointed out by Becker (1975), youth with few family resources under-invest in their
human capital if they cannot obtain adequate credit. This observation has motivated a
voluminous literature examining the relationship between family income (or wealth) and
college attendance (e.g. Manski and Wise 1983, Cameron and Heckman 1998, 2001, Ellwood
and Kane 2000, Carneiro and Heckman 2002, Belley and Lochner 2007). Using U.S. data
from the 1979 and 1997 cohorts of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79
and NLSY97, respectively) and controlling for individual di®erences in ability and family
background, Belley and Lochner (2007) estimate a weak family income { college attendance
relationship in the early 1980s but a much stronger positive relationship in the early 2000s.2
This seems to suggest that borrowing constraints had little e®ect on schooling decisions in the
early 1980s, but that their e®ects have grown more important in recent years. Consistent with
this hypothesis, recent U.S. Department of Education studies (Berkner 2000 and Titus 2002)
report that the fraction of undergraduate student borrowers who borrowed the maximum
allowable amount from federal student loan programs nearly tripled from 18% in 1989-90
to 52% in 1999-2000. At the same time, however, student borrowing from private lending
institutions increased from negligible amounts in the mid-1990s to $14 billion, almost 20%
of all student loans distributed, in the 2004-05 academic year (College Board 2005). Ceteris
paribus, this expansion in private lending should have helped alleviate the tight constraints
imposed by government student loan (GSL) programs.
We study these patterns of college attendance and borrowing in a human capital invest-
ment model that incorporates limited borrowing opportunities from both GSL programs and
private lenders. Our analysis suggests that all of these trends can be explained by the rising
returns to schooling (Katz and Autor 1999, Heckman, Lochner and Todd 2008), rising costs
of attendance at U.S. colleges and universities (College Board 2006), and fairly stable real
borrowing limits associated with GSL programs (Kane 2007) over the last few decades. As
1This has changed in recent years, as we discuss below.
2Using a variety of empirical approaches and data from the NLSY79, a number of researchers have
concluded that borrowing constraints had little e®ect on college-going behavior in the early 1980s. Ellwood
and Kane (2000) also estimate that family income has become a more important determinant of college-going
since 1980. See Section 3 for a review of this literature.
1we discuss further below, our model also implies cross-sectional correlations between ability
and investment that are more in line with U.S. data than does the traditional model with
exogenous borrowing constraints.
The human capital literature has paid little attention to the nature of borrowing con-
straints. Existing models typically assume that either interest rates increase with the amount
borrowed or that there is a ¯xed maximum amount that individuals can borrow.3 Both ap-
proaches neglect the link between borrowing opportunities and investment decisions that
plays a key role in both GSL programs and private lending as we describe below. We show
that without this link, the canonical model of exogenous borrowing constraints predicts
a negative relationship between ability and human capital investment among constrained
borrowers when the consumption intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) is less than
one. This is troubling, since most empirical estimates of the IES are below one (Browning,
Hansen, and Heckman 1999) and a strong positive ability { college attendance relationship
exists for all family income (or wealth) levels in both the NLSY79 and NLSY97 (as we show
in Section 3). Additionally, models with exogenous borrowing constraints o®er no insights
regarding the recent rise in private student lending, the interaction between private and pub-
lic lending, or how lending opportunities respond to important economic and policy changes.
Our framework o®ers insights on all of these issues.
GSL programs directly tie student credit to the level of investment | students can
borrow to help ¯nance college-related expenses only if they are enrolled in school. We show
that private lenders, facing limited repayment incentives from borrowers, will also link credit
limits to the level of investment, as well as observable individual characteristics that a®ect the
returns to investment. These features of endogenously determined (or variable) borrowing
limits help generate a positive relationship between ability and investment (even when the
IES is less than one) while still predicting a positive relationship between family resources
and investment among constrained youth.4
GSL programs have two distinct forms of limits: (i) a pre-speci¯ed maximum loan limit
(denote this by dmax), and (ii) an endogenous limit that restricts students from borrowing
more than they spend on their education.5 As we show, youth that would like to borrow
more than they spend on their schooling (i.e. those constrained by the second limit) invest
the same amount in their human capital as if they were completely unconstrained. When
credit is tied directly to investment, there is no tradeo® between additional investment and
consumption while in school | every additional dollar of investment can be borrowed (as
3Studies assuming variable interest rates (or heterogeneous interest rates) include Becker (1975), Cameron
and Taber (2004) and Card (1995). Studies assuming a ¯xed limit on borrowing include Belley and Lochner
(2007), Caucutt and Kumar (2003), Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz (2003), and Keane and Wolpin (2001).
4We refer to these borrowing limits as `endogenous', because they are a function of the borrower's invest-
ment behavior. We do not model the determination of these limits in the GSL system; however, borrowing
limits set by private lenders are optimally determined from the incentives of borrowers to default.
5Under the Sta®ord Loan Program, students face a cumulative loan limit as well as annual borrowing
limits which increase somewhat with year of post-secondary school.
2long as investment remains below dmax). This implies that consumption decisions may be
severely distorted even when schooling and investment decisions are not.6 Among youth who
would like to invest more than the GSL maximum loan limit dmax, investment is increasing in
family income (or wealth) as has been observed for recent student cohorts. Most importantly,
introducing the restriction that borrowing cannot exceed investment substantially reduces
the set of individuals for which there is a negative ability { investment relationship.
The recent rise in private lending highlights the importance of studying how private
lenders determine student credit levels. Even if human capital cannot be directly repossessed
by lenders, creditors can punish defaulting borrowers in a number of ways (e.g. lowering credit
scores, seizing assets, garnisheeing a fraction of labor earnings), which tend to have a greater
impact on debtors with higher post-school earnings. In our lifecycle model, these mechanisms
e®ectively link private borrowing limits for students to their abilities and human capital
investments.7 Higher ability students who invest more through education will be o®ered
more credit by private lenders, because they can credibly commit to re-pay more given the
punishments they face upon default. The dependence of credit limits on investment and
ability generates a positive ability { investment relationship for all constrained borrowers
under standard parameterizations of preferences.
Our framework incorporates the lending opportunities provided by both GSL programs
and private lenders. This not only provides new insights about human capital investment
behavior, but it also enables us to better understand the changing role played by private
¯nancial markets. In particular, the recent emergence and expansion of private student
lending can be explained by the stability of government student loan limits over the last few
decades and the recent rise in student demand for credit if: (i) GSL maximum borrowing
limits were high enough to ¯nance unrestricted levels of investment in the early 1980s, (ii)
these limits are too low to cover the higher levels of investment desired today, and (iii)
current students can credibly commit to re-pay more than these limits allow. The evidence
on family income { college attendance patterns in the NLSY79 and NLSY97 is consistent
with the ¯rst two conditions. The higher earnings potential of recent graduates, coupled with
higher costs of schooling, can explain why more college students are bunching up against
6Thus, evidence that family resources do not a®ect educational attainment or ¯nancial returns does not
necessarily imply that credit constraints are non-binding. Standard empirical tests for borrowing constraints
that rely on di®erences in educational attainment or marginal rates of return on investment by family
income (or other categories used to di®erentiate the `constrained' from `unconstrained') will under-estimate
the fraction of the population that is constrained as well as the adverse impacts of constraints on welfare.
7Our model of private lending is related to the literature on endogenous credit constraints, which has
generally focused on implications for risk-sharing and asset prices in endowment economies (e.g. Alvarez
and Jermann 2000, Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger 2004, Krueger and Perri 2002, Kehoe and Levine
1993, and Kocherlakota 1996) or ¯rm dynamics (e.g. Albuquerque and Hopenhayn 2004, Monge-Naranjo
2008). Our assumed punishments for default are similar to those employed by Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt
(2007) in their analysis of bankruptcy over the lifecycle. Andolfatto and Gervais (2006) study human capital
accumulation with limited commitment, but they focus on the optimal set of intergenerational transfers and
not on cross-sectional implications for investment.
3GSL maximum borrowing limits (Berkner 2000 and Titus 2002). This creates new demand
for private lenders to step in, o®ering more credit to those who can credibly commit to
repay. With rising returns to schooling, commitments to repay become credible for more
and more college students, suggesting that condition (iii) is likely to be met. Our lifecycle
model calibrated to U.S. data generates these patterns in response to a rise in both the
returns and costs of college.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe borrowing
opportunities from U.S. GSL programs and the recent emergence of private lenders. In
the third section, we discuss evidence on the relationship between ability, family income
and college attendance in the U.S. and brie°y survey the literature on the prevalence of
credit constraints. In Section 4, we develop a simple two-period human capital investment
model to analytically compare the cross-sectional implications for borrowing and investment
under alternative assumptions about credit markets. Section 5 extends our framework to
a lifecycle model that incorporates government subsidies for education. Qualitative results
derived for the two-period model carry over to this environment. We calibrate this model
using U.S. data on schooling, ability, government subsidies, and post-school earnings. This
quantitative analysis shows that our model with both public and private lending does a good
job reproducing observed cross-sectional human capital investment patterns for the early
1980s and 2000s. The model with exogenous constraints does not. Our model of endogenous
constraints also explains both the increased e®ects of family income on college-going and the
rising importance of private lending for recent cohorts as optimal responses to the increased
costs of and ¯nancial returns to human capital investment. Section 6 concludes.
2 Available Sources of Credit
This section brie°y reviews the primary sources of borrowing used for human capital invest-
ment in the U.S. We ¯rst describe key institutional features of GSL programs, which we
incorporate in our endogenous constraint models below. Then, we discuss the rise of private
lending for post-secondary schooling.
2.1 Government Student Loan Programs
Federal student loans are an important source of ¯nance for higher education in the U.S., ac-
counting for 71% of the federal student aid disbursed in 2003-04.8 Most of these government-
backed loans are provided through the Sta®ord Loan program, which awarded nearly $50
billion to students in the 2003-04 academic year, compared to the disbursement of $1.6 billion
through the Perkins Loan program. Slightly more than $7 billion was awarded to parents of
8Many other countries have similar types of government student loan programs.
4undergraduate students in the form of Parent Loans for Undergraduate Students (PLUS).9
GSL programs generally have three important features. First, lending is directly tied to
investment. Students (or parents) can only borrow up to the total cost of college (including
tuition, room, board, books, supplies, transportation, computers, and other expenses directly
related to schooling) less any other ¯nancial aid they receive in the forms of grants or
scholarships. Thus, students cannot borrow from GSL programs to ¯nance non-schooling
related consumption goods or activities. Second, student loan programs set ¯xed upper limits
on the total amount of credit available for each student. Students face both cumulative and
annual loan limits for U.S. federal loan programs.10 Third, loans covered by GSL programs
typically have extended enforcement rules compared to unsecured private loans.
Historically, private lenders have provided the capital to student borrowers (and their
parents) under the Sta®ord and PLUS programs, the government guaranteeing those loans
with a promise to cover any unpaid amounts. Since the 1994-95 academic year, the federal
government has begun to directly provide these loans to some students under the same rules
and terms.11 While Sta®ord loans are disbursed to students, PLUS loans can be taken out by
parents to help cover the costs of their children's schooling. Another major federal student
loan program, the Perkins Loan Program, provides an additional source of government funds
to students most in need; however, its loan o®erings depend on the level of program funding
at the post-secondary institution attended by a student. In practice, Perkins loans make up
a small fraction of federal student loan disbursements.
Table 1 reports loan limits (based on the dependency status and class level of each
student) for Sta®ord and Perkins student loan programs for the period 1993-2007.12 In recent
years, dependent students could borrow up to $23,000 from the Sta®ord Loan Program over
the course of their undergraduate careers. Independent students could borrow roughly twice
that amount, although most traditional undergraduates would not fall into this category.
Quali¯ed undergraduates from low income families could receive as much as $20,000 in
Perkins loans, depending on their need and post-secondary institution. It is important to
note, however, that amounts o®ered through this program have typically been less than
mandated limits.13 Student borrowers can defer loan re-payments until six (Sta®ord) to nine
9See The College Board (2006) for details about ¯nancial aid disbursements and their trends over time.
10Since 1993-94, the PLUS loan program no longer has a ¯xed maximum borrowing limit; however, parents
still cannot borrow more than the total cost of college less other ¯nancial aid received by the student.
11The Sta®ord program o®ers both subsidized and unsubsidized loans. The government covers the interest
on subsidized loans while students are enrolled. Unsubsidized loans accrue interest over this period; however,
the student is not required to make any payments until after leaving school. To qualify for subsidized loans,
students must demonstrate ¯nancial need on the basis of family income, dependency status, and the cost of
the school attended. Most students under age 24 are considered dependent, and their parents' income is an
important determinant of their ¯nancial need. Prior to the introduction of unsubsidized Sta®ord Loans in
the early 1990s, Supplemental Loans to Students (SLS) were an alternative source of unsubsidized federal
loans for independent students.
12Sta®ord loan limits for freshman, sophomores, and graduate students increased slightly in July, 2007.
13Parents that do not have an adverse credit rating can borrow up to the cost of schooling from the PLUS
5Table 1: Borrowing Limits for Sta®ord and Perkins Student Loan Programs (1993-2007)
Sta®ord Loans
Dependent Independent
Students Students¤ Perkins Loans
Eligibility Requirements Subsidized: Financial Need¤¤ Financial Need
Unsubsidized: All Students
Undergraduate Limits:
First Year $2,625 $6,625 $4,000
Second Year $3,500 $7,500 $4,000
Third-Fifth Years $4,000 $8,000 $4,000
Cum. Total $23,000 $46,000 $20,000
Graduate Limits:
Annual $18,500 $6,000
Cum. Total¤¤¤ $138,500 $40,000
Notes:
¤ Students whose parents do not qualify for PLUS loans can borrow up to
independent student limits from Sta®ord program.
¤¤ Subsidized Sta®ord loan amounts can be no greater than the borrowing
limits for dependent students; independent students can also borrow unsubsidized
Sta®ord loans provided that their total (subsidized and subsidized)loan amount
is not greater than the independent student limits.
¤¤¤ Cumulative graduate loan limits include loans from undergraduate loans.
(Perkins) months after leaving school.
Figure 1 shows how annual Sta®ord loan limits for dependent undergraduate students
have evolved from 1980{81 to 2006{07 (denominated in year 2000 dollars).14 In most years,
the cumulative loan limit is equal to or slightly greater than the sum of all ¯ve annual loan
limits. The jumps up re°ect nominal adjustments to the limits in 1986{87 and 1993{94;
otherwise, in°ation has continuously eroded these limits. The entry year into college has
seen the greatest erosion in real borrowing opportunities | a 44% decline from 1982{83 to
2002{03.15 The borrowing limit for second-year students declined by roughly 25% over this
program, with repayment typically beginning within 60 days of loan disbursement. Dependent students
whose parents do not qualify for PLUS loans (due to a bad credit rating) are able to borrow up to the
independent student loan limits.
14The Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) is used to adjust for in°ation.
15Our NLSY79 and NLSY97 respondents made their college attendance decisions around these two periods,
respectively.
6Figure 1: Annual Sta®ord Loan Limits for Dependent Undergraduates from 1980-2006 (Year
2000 Dollars)
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period. By contrast, third- through ¯fth-year undergraduates were able to borrow nearly
20% more in 2002{03 than in 1982{83 due to more substantial nominal increases in 1986{87
and 1993{94. Cumulative Sta®ord loan limits were almost identical in real terms in 1982{83
and 2002{03.16
Student loans covered by these federal programs have extended enforcement rules com-
pared to typical unsecured private loans. Except in very special circumstances, these loans
cannot generally be expunged through bankruptcy. If a suitable re-payment plan is not
agreed upon with the lender once a borrower enters default, the default status will be re-
ported to credit bureaus and collection costs (up to 25% of the balance due) may be added
to the amount outstanding.17 Up to 15% of the borrower's wages can also be garnisheed.
Moreover, federal tax refunds can be seized and applied toward any outstanding balance.
Other sanctions include a possible hold on college transcripts, ineligibility for further federal
student loans, and ineligibility for future deferments or forbearances.18
16Throughout most of this period, loan limits for independent undergraduates remained about twice the
amounts available to dependent students. Sta®ord loan limits for graduate students declined by about 35%
in real terms from 1986{87 to 2006{07, roughly the time our NLSY respondents would have began attending
graduate school.
17Formally, a borrower is considered to be in default once a payment is 270 days late.
18Since the early 1990s, the government has also begun to punish educational institutions with high student
default rates by making their students ineligible to borrow from federal lending programs.
72.2 The Emergence of Private Lenders
Until the mid-1990s, few private lenders o®ered loans to students outside the GSL programs.
In 1995-96, total non-federal student loans amounted to $1.3 billion. By 2004-05, that
amount had risen to almost $14 billion (nearly 20% of all student loans distributed).19 Private
student loans generally charge higher interest rates than Sta®ord or Perkins loans and are,
therefore, typically taken after exhausting available credit from GSL programs. Thus, the
rise in borrowing from private lenders outside the Sta®ord and Perkins Loan Programs
suggests that the GSL limits are no longer enough to satisfy many students' demands for
credit. Private loans are most prevalent among graduate students (especially in professional
schools) and undergraduates at high-cost private universities (Wegmann, Cunningham and
Merisotis 2003).
While many private student lending programs are loosely structured like the federal GSL
programs (i.e. many limit borrowing to the cost of schooling less ¯nancial aid or a ¯xed upper
limit on total borrowing), they vary substantially in their terms and eligibility requirements.
Private lending programs typically use a broader concept of schooling costs than do GSL
programs, often allowing students to borrow against previous educational expenses or ex-
penses for study abroad. Speci¯ed maximum loan limits are generally quite high, especially
for students in professional schools (e.g. law, medical, or business schools); however, actual
amounts o®ered to students vary depending on their creditworthiness, institution attended,
and area of study. A cosigner with a good credit history tends to improve the terms of any
loans and can a®ect whether a loan is o®ered in the ¯rst place.
3 Evidence on the Role of Ability and Family Income
In this section, we discuss the empirical relationship between family income, cognitive ability
and college attendance. We review the recent literature and o®er some new evidence in
documenting three stylized facts on investment in human capital. First, there was a weak
link between family income and college attendance in the early 1980s. Second, for very recent
student cohorts, there is a much stronger relationship between family income (or wealth) and
college attendance. Third, in both the early 1980s and the early 2000s, there is a strong
positive relationship between college attendance and cognitive ability or achievement (as
measured by scores on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test, AFQT).20
Many empirical studies using NLSY79 data conclude that borrowing constraints played
little role in college attendance decisions in the U.S. during the early 1980s. Cameron
19These ¯gures do not include student borrowing on credit cards, which has also increased considerably
over this period. See College Board (2005).
20This evidence is largely based on the NLSY79 and NLSY97. AFQT scores are widely used as measures
of cognitive achievement by social scientists and are strongly correlated with post-school earnings conditional
on educational attainment. See, e.g., Cawley, et al. 2000. Appendix A provides additional details.
8and Heckman (1998, 1999) ¯nd that after controlling for family background, AFQT scores,
and unobserved heterogeneity, family income has little e®ect on college enrollment rates.
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) also estimate small di®erences in college enrollment rates
and other college-going outcomes by family income after accounting for di®erences in family
background and AFQT. Cameron and Taber (2004) ¯nd little evidence of di®erential returns
to school that would be consistent with borrowing constraints. Keane and Wolpin (2001)
estimate a structural model of schooling and work that incorporates constraints on borrowing
and parental transfers that may depend on child schooling decisions. While they estimate
very tight borrowing limits (much more stringent than federal student loan limits), they ¯nd
little e®ect of borrowing constraints on educational attainment.
Much has changed since the early 1980s, when the NLSY79 respondents made their
college attendance decisions. Financial returns to schooling have risen dramatically (Katz
and Autor 1999, Heckman, Lochner, and Todd 2008) as have the costs of tuition, fees, room,
and board at U.S. colleges and universities (College Board 2005). At the same time, real
borrowing limits associated with government student loan programs have remained stable
or declined (see Figure 1).
These trends appear to have increased the importance of borrowing constraints. Indeed,
the fraction of all undergraduate borrowers that borrowed the maximum limit from the
federal Sta®ord Student Loan Program went up from only 18% in 1989-90 to 52% in 1999-
2000. Among dependent undergraduates, the fraction increases to nearly 70% of all borrowers
in 1999-2000 (Berkner 2000 and Titus 2002). Moreover, Belley and Lochner (2007) show
that family income has become a much more important determinant of college attendance
for college-going decisions in the early 2000s.21 Youth from high income families in the
NLSY97 are sixteen percentage points more likely to attend college than are youth from
low income families, conditional on AFQT scores, family composition, parental age and
education, race/ethnicity, and urban/rural residence. This is nearly twice the e®ect observed
in the NLSY79. The combined e®ects of family income and wealth are even more dramatic
in the NLSY97. Comparing youth from the highest family income and wealth quartiles to
those from the lowest quartiles yields an estimated di®erence in college attendance rates of
nearly 30 percentage points after controlling for ability and family background.
Next, we examine the e®ects of ability (as measured by AFQT scores) on college atten-
dance for youth from di®erent family income (or wealth) backgrounds in both the NLSY79
and NLSY97. (See Appendix A for a detailed description of the data and variables used
21Ellwood and Kane (2000) argue that college attendance di®erences by family income were already be-
coming more important by the early 1990s. Using data on youth of college-ages in the 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s (from the Health and Retirement Survey), Brown, Seshadri, and Scholz (2007) estimate that borrowing
constraints limit college-going; however, they do not examine whether constraints have become more limit-
ing in recent years. While Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2007) ¯nd little e®ect of borrowing constraints
(de¯ned by the self-reported desire to borrow more for school) on overall college dropout rates for a recent
cohort of students at Berea College, they ¯nd substantial di®erences in dropout rates between those who are
constrained and those who are not. They do not study the e®ects of borrowing constraints on attendance.
9here.) Figure 2 shows college attendance rates by AFQT quartiles and either family income
or family wealth quartiles in the NLSY79 and NLSY97. For all family income or wealth cat-
egories in both NLSY samples, we observe substantial increases in college attendance with
AFQT. The di®erence in attendance rates between the highest and lowest ability quartiles
range from .47 to .68 depending on the family income or wealth quartile. Most importantly
for our theoretical analysis below, there is no indication that the e®ects of ability are negative
for lower income youth who are most likely to be constrained, especially in the NLSY97.
Of course, AFQT scores may be correlated with other family background variables that
in°uence college attendance decisions conditional on family resources. We, therefore, control
for a host of other family background measures in addition to AFQT quartiles using ordinary
least squares. Table 2 reports the estimated e®ects of AFQT (these estimates re°ect the
di®erence in attendance rates between the reported AFQT quartile and AFQT quartile 1)
on college attendance after controlling for family background characteristics.22 Results are
reported for separate regressions by family income or wealth quartile. The estimates con¯rm
the general patterns observed in Figure 2: ability has strong positive e®ects on college
attendance for all family income and wealth quartiles in both NLSY samples.
4 Basic Models of Borrowing Constraints
We now develop a simple two-period model to study the impact of credit constraints on
investment in human capital. We allow for some generality in preferences and skill production
and derive the qualitative investment { wealth and investment { ability relationships implied
by alternative forms of credit constraints. We show that these relationships depend crucially
on the nature of credit constraints and evaluate the empirical relevance of the di®erent
models based on the empirical ¯ndings discussed above.
4.1 The Model
Consider two-period-lived individuals who invest in schooling in the ¯rst period and work in
the second. Preferences are
U = u(c0) + ¯u(c1), (1)
where ct is consumption in periods t 2 f0;1g, ¯ > 0 is a discount factor and u(¢) satis¯es:
Assumption 1. u : R+ ! R is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously
di®erentiable and limc&0 u0 (c) = +1.
Each individual is endowed with initial ¯nancial assets w ¸ 0 and ability a > 0. Initial
assets represent all transfers from parents and other family members. Ability represents all
22We control for the following: gender, race/ethnicity, mother's education, intact family during adoles-
cence, number of siblings/children under age 18, mother's age at child's birth, urban/metropolitan area of
residence during adolescence, and year of birth.
10Figure 2: College Attendance by AFQT and Family Income or Wealth (NLSY79 and NLSY97)













































AFQT Quartile 1 AFQT Quartile 2 AFQT Quartile 3 AFQT Quartile 4Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
a. NLSY79
AFQT Quartile 2 0.211 0.110 0.120 0.063
(0.044) (0.050) (0.059) (0.065)
AFQT Quartile 3 0.260 0.276 0.369 0.337
(0.058) (0.053) (0.060) (0.062)
AFQT Quartile 4 0.517 0.515 0.574 0.537
(0.068) (0.058) (0.061) (0.062)
Sample Size 545 556 596 591
b. NLSY97
AFQT Quartile 2 0.188 0.348 0.225 0.130 0.260 0.248 0.193 0.178
(0.047) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.052)
AFQT Quartile 3 0.396 0.474 0.352 0.335 0.375 0.376 0.443 0.341
(0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.055) (0.052) (0.048) (0.053)
AFQT Quartile 4 0.575 0.662 0.472 0.403 0.495 0.643 0.527 0.370
(0.062) (0.055) (0.052) (0.049) (0.070) (0.056) (0.050) (0.051)
Sample Size 553 597 677 702 541 573 716 666
Table 2: Estimated Effects of AFQT on College Attendance by Family Income and Wealth (NLSY79 and NLSY97)
Notes: All regressions control for gender, race/ethnicity, mother's education (HS graduate, college attendance), intact family 
during adolescence, number of siblings/children under 18, mother's age at child's birth, urban/metropolitan area during 
adolescence, and year of birth.  Education measured as of age 21 (age 22 if missing at age 21).  Standard errors are in parentheses
Effects of AFQT by Family Income Quartile: Effects of AFQT by Family Wealth Quartile:innate factors, early parental investments and other characteristics that shape the returns to
investing in schooling. We take (w;a) as ¯xed and exogenous to focus on schooling decisions
that individuals make largely on their own.
Labor earnings at t = 1 are y = af (h), where h is schooling investment and f (¢) satis¯es:
Assumption 2. f : R+ ! R+ is strictly increasing, concave, twice continuously di®eren-
tiable, limh&0 f0 (h) = +1 and limh%1 f0 (h) = 0.
Note that both a and h enhance earnings and are complementary. Assumptions 1 and 2
are standard, and we make use of them without further reference. They imply that optimal
solutions in models of this section are interior (positive and ¯nite) and determined by ¯rst
order conditions.
Human capital investment, h, is in units of the consumption good. Individuals can borrow
d of these units (or save, which is indicated by d < 0) at a gross interest rate R > 1. Given
a, h and d, consumption in each of the periods is
c0 = w + d ¡ h, (2)
c1 = af (h) ¡ Rd. (3)









In the absence of ¯nancial frictions, young individuals maximize utility (1) subject to (4).
This maximization can be separated into two steps. The ¯rst is to choose h to maximize the
present value of lifetime net resources, w+ R¡1af (h)¡h. Optimal unrestricted investment,







From this condition, hU (a) is strictly increasing in ability, a, and independent of initial
assets, w.



















From this condition, dU (a;w), is strictly decreasing in w and increasing in a. Optimal
debt dU (a;w) is strictly increasing in ability, a, because of two forces. First, more able
individuals ¯nance a larger investment. Second, more able individuals attain higher net-
lifetime resources and want to consume more during youth. The latter force implies that the
relationship between borrowing and ability is steeper than the relationship between human
capital investment and ability.
11Lemma 1 Let the functions hU (a) and dU (a;w) denote the unrestricted investment in
human capital and borrowing. Then, hU(a) is strictly increasing in a and dU (a;w) is








(Proofs for all results and other analytical details for the models in Section 4 are given in
Appendix B.) We make repeated use of Lemma 1 to characterize the behavior of investment
with borrowing constraints.
4.3 Exogenous Borrowing Constraints
At least since Becker (1975), economists have introduced ¯nancial market imperfections in
models of human capital. With imperfect access to credit, Becker shows that youth from
poor families will invest less (and have higher marginal returns on schooling) than otherwise
identical youth from wealthier families.
Credit constraints are typically introduced by imposing a ¯xed and exogenous upper
bound on the amount of debt.23 Following this approach, assume that borrowing is restricted
by the exogenous constraint:
d · d0, (EXC)
where 0 < d0 < 1 is ¯xed and uniform for all agents. We use the superscript X for
allocations in this model.
In this environment, individuals maximize utility (1) subject to (2), (3), and the bor-








































where ¸ is the LaGrange multiplier on the constraint (EXC) and is strictly positive when









¯u0 (w + dX(a;w) ¡ hX(a;w))
¸ R:
This equation clearly shows that the rate of return on human capital investment is strictly
greater than the return on ¯nancial assets for those constrained by (EXC) since ¸ > 0.
Unconstrained individuals (¸ = 0) equate the marginal return on investment to that of
¯nancial assets as in equation (5) above.
23See, for example, Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Seshadri (2002), Belley and Lochner (2007), Caucutt and
Kumar (2003), Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz (2003), and Keane and Wolpin (2001). Instead, Becker (1975)
assumes that individuals face an increasing interest rate schedule as a function of their investment. Becker's
formulation yields similar predictions to those discussed here.
12For each ability a, a threshold of assets wX
min (a) de¯nes who is constrained and who is
unconstrained. Those with wealth below wX
min(a) are constrained, while those with wealth
above the threshold are unconstrained. The threshold is the level of w such that dU (a;w) =
d0, so it is increasing in ability a. More able individuals need more initial wealth to attain
higher unconstrained levels of investment and consumption. (Appendix B characterizes the
threshold wX
min (a) and the thresholds de¯ned by the other constraints considered in this
section.)
For unconstrained individuals, the trade-o® between early and late consumption is de-
termined by the return on ¯nancial assets, and investment equals hU(a). Constrained indi-
viduals exhaust their ability to bring resources to the early (investment) period (i.e. d = d0).
Their trade-o® between early and late consumption is given by the rate of return on human
capital investment, which is higher than R and increasing in ability. Constrained individuals
must strike a balance between maximizing lifetime earnings and smoothing consumption
over time. For them, optimal investment hX (a;w) is uniquely determined by:
u
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equating the marginal cost of investment in terms of early utility with the marginal bene¯t
in terms of late utility when borrowing is set to the maximum, d0.
We highlight three important results. First, constrained investment never exceeds un-
constrained investment, i.e. hX (a;w) · hU(a). This result holds for all forms of constraints
considered in the paper. Second, constrained investment is strictly increasing in wealth.
Third, constrained investment may be increasing or decreasing in ability depending on the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), ¡u0 (c)=[cu00 (c)].
Proposition 1 Let hX (a;w) and hU (a) denote, respectively, the optimal investment with
and without the constraint (EXC). If (EXC) binds, then: (i) hX (a;w) < hU (a); (ii)




, is strictly greater than R and strictly decreasing in w; and (iv) if the IES · 1,
then hX (a;w) is strictly decreasing in ability, a.
Results (i), (ii) and (iii) are well-known and already discussed in Becker (1975). They
are central to the empirical literature on credit constraints. For instance, Cameron and
Heckman (1998, 1999), Ellwood and Kane (2000), Carneiro and Heckman (2002), and Belley
and Lochner (2007) empirically examine if youth from lower income families acquire less
schooling, conditional on family background and ability. Lang (1993), Card (1995), and
Cameron and Taber (2004) explore the prediction that the marginal return on human capital
investment exceeds the return on ¯nancial assets.
The more interesting and novel result is (iv). It reveals a serious shortcoming of this
model that the literature has not recognized. The model predicts a negative relationship
13between ability and investment for an IES below one.24 This is a serious problem, because
most estimates of the IES are less than one (see Browning, Hansen, Heckman 1999) and a
positive relationship between ability and investment is a robust empirical regularity. The
relationship between ability and investment for constrained youth derives from two opposing
e®ects. On the one hand, an increase in ability raises the ¯nancial returns to investment,
which encourages investment. On the other hand, ability raises lifetime income, which
encourages early consumption. Since constrained youth can only increase early consumption
by investing less, strong preferences for smoothing (i.e. IES·1) imply that the second e®ect
dominates.
4.4 Government Student Loan (GSL) Programs
Consider now, credit limits that exhibit the key features of GSL programs. First, lending is
tied to investment and cannot be used to ¯nance non-schooling related consumption goods
or activities:
d · h: (TIC)
In the absence of other sources of credit, (TIC) is equivalent to c0 ¸ w. This constraint is
endogenous in the sense that borrowing limits depend on the amount of investment under-
taken by an individual. Second, borrowing is constrained by an upper limit 0 < dmax < 1
for the total credit to each student:
d · dmax. (7)
This second constraint is e®ectively the same as the exogenous constraint above. The overall
credit limits induced by GSL programs are:
d · minfh;dmaxg. (GSLC)
We use the superscript G to refer to allocations under a GSL program.
To see the implications of (TIC), ¯rst assume that it is the only constraint.25 In this
case, individuals are unconstrained if their desired investment exceeds desired borrowing, i.e.
hU(a) ¸ dU(a;w). These are individuals who hold wealth that exceeds the ¯nite threshold
~ wmin(a), which is increasing in ability a but at a slower rate than wX
min(a), as shown in
Appendix B. In comparison to exogenous constraint models, (TIC) is more (less) stringent
than (EXC) for low (high) ability individuals in the sense that ~ wmin(a) > wX
min(a) if hU(a) <
d0, and ~ wmin(a) < wX
min(a) if hU(a) > d0.
24An IES · 1 is only a su±cient condition for a negative ability { investment relationship. More generally,
the model may predict a negative relationship for IES values greater than one. While the model formally
abstracts from foregone earnings, it is isomorphic to one in which foregone earnings for any given investment,
h, are independent of ability. Result (iv) holds more generally in a model with foregone earnings as long as
youth wage rates are not strictly decreasing in ability.
25This is the most appropriate model when upper borrowing limits are non-existent or set very high (e.g.
PLUS program for students' parents).




fu(w) + ¯u[af (h) ¡ Rh]g,
which is equivalent to maximizing late consumption, c1 = af(h)¡Rh. In this case, optimal
investment equals the unconstrained amount hU(a).
Tying borrowing to investment removes the con°ict between smoothing consumption and
maximizing net lifetime resources. If (TIC) is the only constraint on credit, everyone ends up
investing the unconstrained amount, hU(a), regardless of initial wealth. Only consumption
decisions are distorted by the constraint. Empirical tests based on investment di®erences
by family resources would always conclude that borrowing constraints are non-binding, even
when consumption allocations are distorted. Empirical tests must use measures of consump-
tion over time to detect this constraint.
Consider now the full GSL constraint (GSLC). For ease of exposition, assume that
dmax = d0, so (EXC) coincides with (7). In this case, unconstrained individuals are those
whose wealth exceeds the threshold wG
min(a) ´ maxfwX
min(a); ~ wmin(a)g, which increases with
ability a, because both wX
min(a) and ~ wmin(a) do. Let ¹ a denote the highest ability for which
the unconstrained investment can be ¯nanced by the GSL alone, i.e. hU(¹ a) = dmax.
We now examine the relationship between investment, ability and wealth under a GSL
program. Of course, those with wealth w ¸ wG
min(a) are unconstrained and invest hU(a).
They are able to smooth consumption optimally. There are three potential groups of con-
strained individuals with w < wG
min(a). The ¯rst group is composed of lower ability persons
with a < ¹ a who are constrained by (TIC) only. They invest the unrestricted level hU(a)
but would like to borrow more for consumption purposes. The second and third groups are
composed of more able individuals with a > ¹ a. The second group is constrained by (7)
only. These individuals borrow dmax and invest more than this using some of their initial
assets w to help ¯nance schooling. For them, the GSL and exogenous constraint models are
equivalent. Investment coincides with hX(a;w), because (TIC) is slack. The third group of
very poor high ability youth is constrained by both (7) and (TIC). They borrow and invest
the maximum amount, dmax.
The previous discussion can be formally summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 Assume that u(¢) has IES · 1. Let dmax = d0 > 0, and hG(a;w), hX(a;w),
hU(a) be, respectively, the optimal human capital investment under the GSL, exogenous con-
straints, and when unconstrained. Let ¹ a > 0 be de¯ned by hU(¹ a) = dmax, and let ^ w :
[¹ a;1) ! R+ be de¯ned by hX [a; ^ w(a)] = dmax, the (possibly in¯nite) wealth level that leads






hU(a) a · ¹ a or w ¸ wX
min(a)
hX(a;w) a > ¹ a and w < ^ w(a)
dmax otherwise.
15Regardless of the IES, hG(a;w) always has a region in which it is increasing in ability, a,
and independent of initial wealth, w, and may have another region in which it is constant and
equal to dmax.26 If utility has an IES less than or equal to 1, there is a region (of middle-high
abilities) in which investment decreases with ability as in the exogenous constraint model,
but the additional constraint (TIC) shrinks this region.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the behavior of hG(a;w), hX(a;w), and hU(a) for the empirically
relevant case of IES · 1. These ¯gures also display unconstrained borrowing as a function
of ability for di®erent levels of wealth. (Recall that ¹ a is the ability level satisfying hU(¹ a) =
dmax, and let ¹ w ´ wG
min(¹ a) re°ect the level of wealth below which agents of ability ¹ a are
constrained.) Figure 3 displays investment and borrowing behavior for two low levels of
wealth, ¹ w and a lower level wL < ¹ w. The ¯gure reveals that under the GSL, all low-
wealth individuals with ability below ¹ a invest the unrestricted level hU(a), while those with
ability above ¹ a invest dmax. Investment under the GSL for these individuals is increasing or
constant in ability and independent of wealth (for any wealth w · ¹ w). Contrast this with
the behavior of hX(a;wL), which is increasing in w and decreasing in a above a2, the point at
which dU(a;wL) = d0. Investments are weakly higher under the GSL than under exogenous
constraints.
Figure 4 illustrates investment behavior for a higher level of wealth wH > ¹ w. In this
case, optimal investment is the same under the GSL and exogenous constraints up to ability
level a4. Hence, it ¯rst coincides with hU(a) until dU(a;wH) reaches dmax at ability a3; then
it decreases in ability through a4. Above this point, more able individuals are constrained
to invest dmax by (TIC). Without this constraint, these individuals would invest less than
dmax as in the exogenous constraint model.
Three points about investment under the GSL are worth highlighting. First, invest-
ment under the GSL equals the unconstrained level for a larger range of middle ability
and low/middle wealth individuals than under exogenous constraints (e.g. individuals with
wealth wL and ability a 2 (a2;¹ a] in Figure 3). While constraint (TIC) increases the number
of constrained agents, it also encourages investment for those who would like to borrow more
than they spend on schooling. This implies a positive relationship between investment and
ability and no relationship between investment and wealth for a broader range of ability
and wealth levels. Second, among higher ability and middle/high wealth individuals, the
(TIC) restriction ensures that investment never falls below dmax. With an IES less than one,
this shrinks the range of abilities for which investment is negatively related to ability (e.g.
individuals with ability a > a4 in Figure 4). Third, among high ability types, investment
is weakly increasing in initial assets (e.g. individuals with ability a 2 (a3;a4) in Figure 4).
26If hX(a;w) is always increasing in a (e.g. for an IES su±ciently greater than one), then hG(a;w) is
globally increasing in both arguments. The characterization is as follows: hG(a;w) = hU(a), for a · ¹ a or
w ¸ wX
min(a); hG(a;w) = dmax for a > ¹ a and w < ^ w(a) and hG(a;w) = hX(a;w) otherwise. The °at region
where investment equals dmax may not exist.
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hG(a,wH)
dU(a, ¯ w) dU(a,wH) hU(a)
hX(a,wH)
ability (a)
17Altogether, the implied investment { ability and investment { wealth relationships in the
GSL model are closer to the empirical ¯ndings discussed earlier. In particular, the set of in-
dividuals whose investment declines with ability is smaller than in the traditional exogenous
constraint model.
When dmax = d0, credit is more limited under the GSL than under the exogenous con-
straint, because the GSL imposes an additional restriction on borrowing. While the extra
restriction (TIC) adversely a®ects utility and early consumption levels, it encourages invest-
ment relative to the exogenous constraint model. The following proposition compares the
allocations and utility under the GSL, exogenous constraints, and unconstrained models:
Lemma 2 Impose d0 = dmax and let fhm;cm
0 ;cm
1 ;Umg, denote the optimal allocations and





















and any of the inequalities is strict if the extra constraint between a pair of models is binding.
On one hand, the addition of (TIC) reduces the feasible set and hence attainable utility
levels. On the other hand, it relieves the tension between income maximization and con-
sumption smoothing that is inherent in the exogenous constraint model. This is particularly
important for those who would like to borrow more than they want to invest. The GSL
forces these individuals to invest more than they would otherwise choose and can dramati-
cally distort their consumption pro¯les.
4.5 Private Lending under Limited Commitment
The inalienability of human capital and the lack of other forms of collateral are standard jus-
ti¯cations for introducing borrowing constraints to models of human capital accumulation.
Most often, however, the nature of credit limits that arise from these incentive problems
is left unexplored. In this subsection, we consider constraints that arise from the limited
commitment of borrowers to repay loans. In the following subsection, we consider the coex-
istence of private lenders that face limited commitment from borrowers with a GSL program
that is perfectly enforced.
A rational borrower repays his loans if and only if the cost of repaying is lower than
the cost of defaulting. The incentive to repay can be foreseen by rational lenders who, in
response, limit their supply of credit.27 Since penalties for default impose a larger monetary
cost for borrowers with higher earnings and assets | only so much can be taken from someone
with little to take | the credit o®ered to an individual is directly related to his perceived
future earnings. Since earnings are determined by ability and investment, credit limits and
investments will be jointly determined in equilibrium.
27Gropp, Scholz, and White (1997) empirically support this form of response by private lenders.
18To examine human capital in this environment, we ¯rst characterize the credit con-
straints that arise endogenously from limited commitment. To this end, we simply assume
that lenders can punish defaulting borrowers by garnisheeing a fraction ~ · 2 (0;1) of their
earnings.28 In Section 5.5, we incorporate additional punishments for default in a richer
lifecycle model.
Given the punishment for default, repayment decisions are simple: borrowers repay (prin-
cipal plus interest on a debt d) if the payment Rd is less than the punishment cost ~ ·af(h).
Foreseeing this, lenders choose to limit borrowing to:
d · ·af (h), (8)
where · ´ R¡1~ · < R¡1. We use the superscript L to refer to this model.
Individuals are unconstrained if their desired borrowing is compatible with its credible




. This condition implies that unconstrained individ-
uals possess wealth above a ¯nite threshold wL
min(a). This threshold increases at a slower
rate in a than does wX
min(a), and it may even be decreasing in a if · is large enough. Indeed,
wL
min (a) may be zero or negative for some values of a, in which case all individuals with those
abilities are unconstrained. In contrast with exogenous constraint models, a higher ability
may reduce the likelihood that an individual is constrained.
Consider constrained individuals who possess wealth w < wL
min (a). Since (8) holds with
equality, investment h determines consumption as given by c0 (h) = w + ·af (h) ¡ h and
c1 (h) = af (h)(1 ¡ ·R). At low levels of investment, there is no tradeo® between early and
late consumption. However, this is not true at higher levels, where the marginal returns to
investment are lower and credit limits increase less with additional investments. Obviously,
optimal investment, hL (a;w), must lie in the region where there is a trade-o®. It equates
the marginal cost of investing (the value of foregone early consumption) with the marginal



























With this condition, we characterize the implied ability { investment and wealth { investment
relationships as follows:
Proposition 3 Let hL (a;w) and hU(a) denote, respectively, optimal investment in human
capital with credit constraints driven by limited commitment to repay loans and in the un-
restricted allocation. If constraint (8) binds, then: (i) hL (a;w) < hU (a), (ii) hL (a;w)
is strictly increasing in w; (iii) a su±cient condition for hL (a;w) to be strictly increas-
ing in a is that the IES is uniformly bounded below by (1 ¡ ·R); and (iv) if the IES is
non-decreasing in consumption and ¯R ¸ 1, then hL (a;w) is strictly increasing in a if
IES (c0) ¸ 1 ¡ (1 + R)·.
28Penalty avoidance actions like re-locating, working in the informal economy, borrowing from loan sharks,
or renting instead of buying a home are all costly to those who default and would contribute to ~ ·.
19As noted earlier, the responsiveness of credit limits to ability and investment creates
a tendency for more able persons to be unconstrained. Proposition 3 shows that this re-
sponsiveness also creates a tendency for constrained investment hL (a;w) to be increasing in
ability. In Section 5, we derive the implied values of · within a more empirically plausible
environment and ¯nd that for any reasonable values of the IES, this model produces a pos-
itive ability { investment relationship. Proposition 3 and its parallel in Section 5 show that
this endogenous constraint model is qualitatively consistent with the two key cross-sectional
patterns reported earlier.
Notice that the endogeneity of credit to investment reduces the marginal cost of investing
for constrained individuals from 1 to 1¡·af0 (h) units of current consumption. This should
encourage more investment relative to the simple exogenous constraint model. The following
proposition compares the two models at the same level of credit and shows that this is indeed
the case.
Proposition 4 Fix any (a;w) such that w < wL
min (a). Let hL (a;w) and dL (a;w) denote,
respectively, optimal investment and borrowing in the limited commitment model. Consider
the allocations in an exogenous constraint model, where d0 = dL (a;w). Then, w < wX
min (a)
and hX (a;w) < hL (a;w).
4.6 GSL Programs Plus Private Lenders
We now study the interaction of GSL programs with private sources of ¯nancing. To this
end, we assume that loans from the GSL are fully enforced, while private lenders face limited
repayment incentives.29 This assumption, while strong, is motivated by the fact that GSL
programs have much stronger punishments at their disposal than we observe for private
unsecured lending. (See Section 2.)
With these two sources of credit, a young individual chooses human capital investments
h, borrowing from the GSL dg, and borrowing from private lenders dp to maximize utility
(1) subject to the sequential budget constraints
c0 = w + dg + dp ¡ h,
c1 = af [h] ¡ Rdg ¡ Rdp,
the GSL lending guidelines
dg · minfh;dmaxg,
29Alternatively, consider the other extreme in which loans from the GSL face the same limited repayment
incentives as private loans. In this case, the presence of the GSL program can only make a di®erence with
respect to the allocations under limited commitment if some individuals default on GSL loans in equilibrium.
One can show that the GSL is default-proof if aL ´ Rdmax
~ ·f(dmax) is less than or equal to the lower bound for
the support of ability in the population and if the punishment ~ · is an upper bound for the elasticity of the
human capital production function (i.e. f0 (h)h=f (h)). In this case, the GSL is completely redundant, and
the allocations coincide with the model with only private lending.
20and the repayment enforcement constraint for private lending
dp · ·af (h).
We refer to this case with the superscript G + L.
As with the previous models, for each ability level a, there is a ¯nite threshold level
of initial assets, w
G+L
min (a), above which an individual attains the unconstrained allocations.
With both sources of credit, w
G+L






, so fewer individuals are




min (a) can be decreasing in a and may even be negative.
We ¯rst compare our model with both private and government lending with our model
with only private lending. The introduction of a GSL program that fully enforces investments
up to dmax leads individuals with ability levels a · ¹ a (i.e. hU (a) · dmax) to attain their
unrestricted optimal investment amounts. For those with a > ¹ a, the GSL ensures a minimum
investment of dmax. This investment ensures the repayment of at least ·af [dmax] in private
loans, which private lenders are willing to provide. The availability of extra resources allows
for additional investment, which further increases the credit available from private sources.
Individuals for whom w
G+L
min (a) < w < wL
min(a) invest more under private lenders and the
GSL than with only private lenders.
We now compare our model with both private and government lending to the GSL
alone. For those with ability a · ¹ a, the GSL program provides enough credit to attain
the unrestricted optimum investment. For them, the availability of private credit has no







min (a) < w < wG
min(a) to optimally smooth consumption and to attain a higher level
of utility. For those with a > ¹ a, the GSL program does not provide su±cient funds for de-
sired investment. At the very least, private lenders ¯nance ·af [dmax] in early consumption
and investment. For those with w
G+L
min (a) < w < wG
min(a), investment is higher with private
lenders and the GSL than with the GSL alone.
Proposition 5 Let hL(a;w), hG(a;w) and hL+G(a;w) denote, respectively, optimal invest-
ment under private markets with limited commitment, fully enforced GSL, and with both
sources simultaneously. Then: (i) hL (a;w) · hL+G (a;w) and hG (a;w) · hL+G (a;w).
Moreover, the ¯rst inequality is strict if w < wL
min (a) (i.e. constraint (8) binds) and the
second inequality is strict if a > ¹ a and w < wG
min (a). (ii) Let hL+G (a;w;dmax) denote op-
timal investment with both sources of credit and an upper GSL credit limit of dmax. Then,
hL+G (a;w;dmax) is strictly increasing in dmax when a > ¹ a and w < w
G+L
min (a).
The implied relationship between human capital investment, ability, and wealth is as
follows. If ability is low (i.e. a < ¹ a), investment equals the unconstrained amount for any
w. Among more able agents with a ¸ ¹ a, those with w ¸ w
G+L
min (a) are unconstrained and
21the rest are constrained. For the latter, hL+G (a;w) is less than hU (a) and increases with
wealth, w. Under the conditions of Proposition 3, hL+G (a;w) is increasing in ability, and
the model with both private lenders and the GSL is qualitatively consistent with investment
patterns in the data. The existence of the GSL ensures the unconstrained optimal amount
of investment for a broader range of ability and wealth levels, while the existence of private
lenders delivers the empirically observed positive ability { investment relationship over the
full distribution of abilities and wealth levels. Both sources of credit play an important role
in determining investment.
Our preferred model for studying human capital formation includes both public and
private sources of lending. First, both sources provide signi¯cant credit for higher education
in the U.S. Second, incorporating the combined constraints of GSL programs and private
lenders in our model produces patterns for investment, ability, and family resources that are
qualitatively consistent with U.S. data. Moreover, as we now show, a calibrated model with
both sources of credit performs well quantitatively.
5 A Quantitative Model
In this section, we extend our framework to a multi-period setting and incorporate education
subsidies in order to explore the quantitative implications of alternative forms of borrow-
ing constraints. After calibrating the model to match the U.S. economy, we compare the
predicted cross-sectional patterns for investment, ability, and wealth under di®erent assump-
tions about credit constraints. We also simulate an increase in both the returns to and costs
of schooling (as observed over the 1980s and 1990s in the U.S.) in order to see whether our
model with public and private lending can explain the rising importance of family resources
(as a determinant of schooling) and private lending for college. Overall, the model performs
well when compared against the empirical patterns discussed in Section 3.
5.1 The Model













where c(t) is consumption at t, ¾ > 0 is the inverse of the IES, and ½ > 0 is the discount
rate.
Life is divided into three stages: \Youth", t 2 [0;1], when individuals attend school and
do not work; \maturity," t 2 [1;P], when they participate full-time in labor markets; and
\retirement," t 2 [P;T], when they do neither and consume from accumulated savings.
At t = 0, individuals are endowed with ¯nancial assets w ¸ 0 and an ability level a > 0.
22Initial resources, w, can be seen as the present value of family transfers.30 Ability, a, re°ects
genetic traits, early educational investments, and other individual characteristics that may
determine the returns on investment.
For simplicity, we assume that the market interest rate equals ½, so individuals prefer
°at lifecycle consumption pro¯les when unconstrained. While we explicitly model di®erent
forms of credit constraints that apply during the \youth" investment period, we assume
that credit markets are frictionless once individuals enter the labor market.31 This greatly
simpli¯es the analysis and allows us to focus on the e®ects of constraints most directly
related to investment decisions (and to tightly link this lifecycle framework with that of our
two-period model above).
Government subsidizes schooling in two ways. First, it provides all young persons with
a free-of-charge investment °ow ipub ¸ 0. Second, it matches every privately ¯nanced unit
of investment with additional s ¸ 0 units.32 Hence, an individual that privately invests
x(t) ¸ 0, attains a total investment °ow of
i(t) = ipub + (1 + s)x(t). (10)
Schooling determines the total stock of human capital investment as of t = 1, h, with






Labor earnings, y (t), depend on ability, a, total human capital investment, h, and labor
market experience, t ¡ 1:




for all t 2 [1;P]. The constant gs determines the relative productivity of investments over
time during \youth". To simplify the exposition, and to abstract from tangential issues
regarding the timing of investment, we assume that gs = ½. This allows us to focus on the
total stock of investment, h, while ignoring the particular investment sequence that lead to
h. The constant ¹ ´ ½=[e½ ¡ 1] is introduced as a normalization to simplify some of the
expressions below. Finally, g ¸ 0 is the rate of return to labor market experience (or the
rate of growth in earnings over the lifecycle).33
30For simplicity of exposition, we will assume that human capital is produced from goods rather than
time inputs. We could equivalently assume that human capital investment only requires time inputs and
that an individual's total `initial wealth', w, re°ects family transfers plus the total discounted value of
earnings he could receive if he worked (rather than attended school) full-time during \youth". In this case,
private investment costs re°ect any earnings foregone for school. Our calibration below implicitly assumes
both goods and time investments are perfectly substitutable and combines these costs to determine total
investment in human capital.
31Cameron and Taber (2004) make an analogous assumption in their framework.
32Given our assumptions below, the timing of `free' investment will be irrelevant { only the total discounted
value of all `free' investment matters. All investment not provided free is subsidized at rate s.
33Our main theoretical results extend to the case where g is increasing in a (i.e. more able individuals have
steeper wage pro¯les).
235.2 Unrestricted Allocations
Assuming frictionless competitive ¯nancial markets (with market interest rate ½), an indi-














Since the interest rate equals the discount rate, optimal consumption is constant over
time. Also, since gs = ½, the optimal timing of investment is indeterminate. Without loss of
generality, we can impose x(t) = x ¸ 0 for all t 2 [0;1], and then solve for the optimal x,









[a©[ipub + (1 + s)x]
® ¡ x], (14)
where the constant © converts initial earnings into the present value of life-time earnings as
of t = 1. (The expression for ©, which depends on P, g and ½, is shown in Appendix C.)
Optimal unconstrained investment, hU (a), maximizes the right-hand side of (14). In-
dividuals with ability a · a0 ´ [ipub]
1¡®
®(1+s)© do not ¯nd it worth investing above the publicly
provided amount, so h = ipub for them. Those with a > a0 invest until the marginal return
equals the (private) marginal cost. For all individuals, optimal investment in human capital
is completely independent of consumption decisions and initial assets:
h







As before, investment is solely determined by ability.
Using (14) and (15), the amount of debt that the individual carries when he enters the
























where the ¯rst term captures the fraction of life-time earnings that the agent would like to
borrow and consume during youth and the second term relates debt to the gap between own
resources, w, and out-of-pocket optimal investment, xU (a). From this formula, it can be
veri¯ed that ¡1 <
@dU(a;w)




@a ¸ 0 as in the two-period model.
5.3 Exogenous Borrowing Constraints
We now introduce exogenous credit constraints. As in the two-period model, assume that
there is an upper bound on the amount of credit that an individual can accumulate while in
school:
d · d0, (17)
24where d is the accumulated amount of debt as of t = 1 and 0 · d0 < 1. As noted earlier,
we assume that credit after t = 1 is unconstrained.
The budget constraint during youth is
R 1
0 e¡½t [c(t) + x]dt · w + e¡½d, since own re-
sources, w, plus debt, d, ¯nance the °ows of investment, x, and consumption, c(t), for
t 2 [0;1]. During youth, consumption will be constant, denoted c0, since the interest rate is
equal to the discount rate and the constraint (17) does not distort the intertemporal allo-
cation of consumption within the interval [0;1]. Using these results, the budget constraint
during youth simpli¯es to






After school (i.e. in the time interval [1;T]), consumption is also constant at the (poten-
tially di®erent) level c1, since post-schooling ¯nancial markets are frictionless. The value of
c1 is determined by ¹¡1a©h®¡d, the di®erence between the present value of lifetime earnings
and the ¯nancial liabilities carried from youth. In Appendix C, we show that V (h;d;a), the
person's utility as of t = 1, is


















¡½V ([ipub + (1 + s)x];d;a). (19)
Individuals choose x ¸ 0, c0 ¸ 0 and d to maximize U (c0;x;d;a) subject to (17) and (18).
Aside from the possibility of x = 0, this problem is analytically identical to the corresponding
problem in the two-period model, and Proposition 1 holds.
5.4 Government Student Loan Programs
As with exogenous constraints, an analysis of GSL programs in this environment is straight-
forward and follows that of our two-period model. Instead of (17), cumulative debt as of
t = 1, d, is restricted to satisfy:
d · minfx;dmaxg. (20)
Note that borrowing is tied to out-of-pocket investment, x, and not to total investment, h.
Individuals choose x ¸ 0, c0 ¸ 0, and d to maximize U (c0;x;d;a) subject to (20) and
(18). Aside from the link of d to x instead of h, and the possibility of x = 0, this problem is
analytically identical to the corresponding problem in the two-period model. Proposition 2
holds. See details in Appendix C.
5.5 Private Lending with Limited Commitment
Now, consider private loans for schooling that are subject to limited enforcement. As in the
two-period model, loans are repaid if and only if the cost of defaulting is higher than the
25cost of repaying. The incentives to repay at dates t ¸ 1 de¯ne the amount of credit lenders
are willing to supply during the schooling period.
We consider two penalties for default. First, defaulting borrowers are reported to credit
bureaus, an action that is assumed to prevent the borrower from accessing formal credit
markets for some period. This penalty does not reduce earnings, but it disrupts the ability
to smooth consumption and can be quite costly if labor earnings grow quickly with age or
if the IES is low. Second, the borrower forfeits a fraction ° 2 [0;1) of his labor earnings.
The fraction ° encompasses direct garnishments from lenders as well as the costs of actions
taken by the borrower to avoid direct penalties (e.g. working in the informal sector, renting
instead of owning a house, etc.). We assume that both penalties are active for an interval of
length 0 < ¼ < P ¡ 1 that starts the moment default takes place.34
Consistent with our earlier assumptions about post-investment credit markets, we assume
that loans contracted after schooling are fully enforceable and that loans contracted while
in school can only be defaulted on at age t = 1. We explicitly focus on credit constraints
directly related to the ¯nancing of schooling.35
The amount of debt that a person can credibly commit to repay depends on the discounted
utility associated with default. Consider a person with ability a and human capital h that
defaults at t = 1 on debt d. Since punishments are not reduced by partial re-payment, all
defaults would be on the entire debt. During the punishment period [1;1 + ¼], consumption
is c(t) = (1 ¡ °)¹¡1ah®eg(t¡1). From t = 1 + ¼ onwards, a fresh start allows the person
to fully smooth consumption, including the time after retirement. The maximized t = 1
discounted utility of a person who chooses to default at the end of the schooling period is
V





where ^ £°;¼ is a positive constant, the expression for which is shown in Appendix C.
Rational lenders foresee the repayment incentives of borrowers and restrict credit to
avoid triggering default. Given penalties (¼;°) a borrower with ability a and human capital
investment h is better o® repaying a level of debt d when V D (h;a) · V (h;d;a). In our
setting, this is equivalent to:
d · ·¹
¡1a©[ipub + (1 + s)x]
® , (21)





¸ 0 incorporates the e®ects of both the garnishment and distor-
tions to consumption pro¯les. Notice that credit limits are proportional to labor earnings,
just as we imposed in the two-period model. However, in this model, the value of · is deter-
mined by preferences (½;¾) and institutions (°;¼). Below we show that · can be large even
if wage garnishments, °, are negligible.
34Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) make a similar set of assumptions in modelling U.S. bankruptcy
regulations.
35Monge-Naranjo (2007) considers a continuous time model in which the agent can default in any period.
26Some aspects of the determination of · are worth mentioning. First, · is increasing in
° and ¼. The option to default is less tempting with harsher punishments. Second, · > 0
as long as ¼ > 0, even if ° = 0. The exclusion from ¯nancial markets alone su±ces to
sustain lending. Third, if ¼ = 0, the model boils down to an exogenous constraint model
with d0 = 0, since no lending can be sustained in equilibrium, i.e. · = 0.
With credit limits determined by limited commitment, a person chooses investment,
consumption and borrowing (x ¸ 0, c0 ¸ 0 and d) to maximize U (c0;x;d;a) subject to (18)
and (21). Given the endogenously determined · and ignoring the possibility of x = 0, this
problem is analytically identical to the two-period case and a parallel to Proposition 3 holds.
Proposition 6 Let ability and ¯nancial assets of a young individual be (a;w), and let
hL (a;w) and hU (a) indicate, respectively, the optimal investments in human capital with
private lenders with limited commitment and in the unrestricted allocation. If a · a0,
then hL (a;w) = hU (a) = ipub. If instead a > a0 and constraint (21) binds, then: (i)
hL (a;w) < hU (a); (ii) hL(a;w) is strictly increasing in w; and (iii) hL(a;w) is strictly






This proposition is central to our quantitative analysis of credit constraints, given its
empirically veri¯able predictions.
Recall from our discussion in Section 4.3 that strong preferences for smooth consumption
(i.e. a high ¾ or low IES) generate a negative ability { investment relationship when credit
constraints are exogenously ¯xed. This tendency also exists when constraints are endogenous
since @·(¾)=@¾ ¸ 0, which implies that a stronger link between investment and credit
limits (i.e. a larger ·) is needed to generate a positive ability { investment relationship as
preferences for smooth consumption become stronger. However, a greater preference for
smooth consumption pro¯les also makes the default punishment of exclusion from credit
markets more painful. Private lenders will be willing to o®er more credit if the cost of
defaulting is higher. Thus, · is also increasing in ¾ under limited commitment. Below, we
show that for empirically plausible punishment parameters (°;¼) the e®ect of ¾ on · often
dominates its e®ect on ·(¾), and a higher value of ¾ (or lower IES) makes it more rather
than less likely that condition (iii) of this proposition holds. Most importantly, we show
that · > ·(¾) for empirically plausible parameters, so that the model implies a positive
relationship between investment and ability for all ability and initial wealth levels.
5.6 GSL Programs Plus Private Lenders
Finally, we consider the coexistence of a GSL program with private lenders. As before,
we assume that the repayment of loans from the GSL program is fully enforced. As noted
earlier, this assumption is in line with the fact that GSL programs in the U.S. are better
protected against default than private unsecured loans. First, private loans can be cleared
27in bankruptcy proceedings while GSL loans cannot. This implies a longer (potentially un-
limited) punishment period for government loans. Second, wage garnishments of up to 15%
are explicitly incorporated in GSL programs, whereas no explicit rate exists for private un-
secured loans. Third, GSL programs include a wide array of additional punishments for
those who default that have no counterpart in the private sector (e.g. governments can seize
income tax returns for those defaulting on a GSL program loan).
With both public and private sources of credit, a young person with (a;w) chooses out-of-
pocket investment x, consumption during youth c0, borrowing from GSL dg, and borrowing
from private lenders dp to maximize U (c0;x;d;a) subject to (18) and
d · dp + dg (22)
dp · ·¹
¡1a©[ipub + (1 + s)x]
® , (23)
dg · minfx;dmaxg. (24)
The threshold level of initial assets w
G+L
min (a) above which individuals with ability a are
unconstrained is given in Appendix C. As with the two-period model, this threshold is lower
and fewer people are constrained than under the GSL alone or under private markets alone.
Proposition 5 of the two-period model also applies in this setting.
5.7 Calibration
We now calibrate parameter values to explore the quantitative implications of the model.
Some of the parameters are estimated using data on earnings and educational attainment
from the random sample of males in the NLSY79. Other parameter values are calibrated
to replicate features of the U.S. economy. We use AFQT quartiles to measure ability. All
dollar amounts are denominated in 1999 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U).
Table 3 reports the value of all parameters used in our baseline simulations.
We assume that youth (investment period) begins at age 16 and ends at age 24. Maturity
(labor market participation period) runs from age 24 until age 65. Retirement runs from
age 65 until death at age 80. Since youth lasts one period in the model, each interval of
unit length corresponds to 8 years of life. Dates for retirement and death are, respectively,
P = (65 ¡ 16)=8 = 6:125, and T = (80 ¡ 16)=8 = 8.
To match an annual interest rate of 4%, we set ½ = 8 £ ln(1:04) = 0:319 for the value of
the discount rate in the model. We set ¾ = 2 as our baseline value to match an IES of 0:5,
an intermediate value in the estimates in Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999). Values
of ¾ inside the interval [1:5;3] yield similar results.
Based on U.S. bankruptcy regulations, we set ¼ = 7=8 = 0:875 (7 year penalty period)
as the baseline length of penalties. Also, we set ° = 0:1 for the fraction of lost earnings for
individuals who default. Under the GSL program guidelines, defaulting borrowers face an
explicit 15% wage garnishment. For private unsecured loans, an explicit garnishment rule
28Table 3: Baseline Model Parameters
Calibrated Parameters Estimated Parameters (from Log Earnings)
Parameter Value To match: Parameter Value Estimates for:
P 6.125 Retirement at 65 g 0.369 Experience
T 8 Lifespan of 80 ® 0.432 Schooling investment
¼ 0.875 7 yrs., U.S. Bankruptcy
½ 0.3138 Annual rate = 4% Ability Levels:
¾ 2 IES = 0.5 ~ a1 106.70 AFQT quartile 1
° 0.1 Garnishment & other costs ~ a2 137.83 AFQT quartile 2
ipub 65,239 Educ. costs through grade 9 ~ a3 157.38 AFQT quartile 3
s 1.19 Educ. subsidy grades 10+ = 54% ~ a4 158.29 AFQT quartile 4
does not exist. However, actual costs of default | either via direct penalties or via avoidance
actions | extend beyond simple garnishments (e.g. individuals may end up suboptimally
employed, renting instead of owing a house, and paying subprime interest rates for short-
term transactions, etc.) Since the implied · varies little with °, our results are not sensitive
to reasonable variations in this parameter.
We assume all investment through age 16 is publicly provided for free. After age 16,
schooling entails direct costs (i.e. tuition and public expenditures on primary, secondary,
and post-secondary schooling) and indirect costs (i.e. foregone earnings). To compute di-
rect costs we use an annual government expenditure of $5;928 for primary and secondary
schooling. Annual direct expenditures for college and graduate education are assumed to
equal $16;838.36 (College expenditures include government expenditures as well as tuition
and fees paid by students.) We set ipub = $65;239, which is equal to the discounted value of
all direct schooling expenditures through grade nine.37 This is consistent with our focus on
investments made from age 16 onwards.
Because of the laws on compulsory schooling and minimum work age, we only include
foregone earnings as part of investment costs for grades ten and above. To estimate foregone
earnings, we use data from the NLSY79 to regress log earnings on indicators for each possible
year of completed schooling from grade 10 through six years of post-secondary studies,
indicators for AFQT quartiles, total years of potential work experience and experience-
squared.38 From this regression, we compute foregone earnings for S ¸ 10 years of schooling
36Annual expenditure for education through grade twelve (for college and graduate education) is the
average of annual current expenditures per pupil for public primary and secondary schools (for all two
and four year colleges) over the academic years 1979-80 through 1988-89 as reported in Table 170 (Table
342) of the Digest of Education Statistics, 1999. These years roughly re°ect the years our NLSY79 sample
respondents made their ¯nal schooling decisions.
37We use a 4% annual discount rate, reporting the value discounted to the end of grade nine. Less than
0.2% of our NLSY79 sample acquired less than 10 years of school.
38This regression uses all available earnings observations for male respondents with at least nine years of
29using the predicted earnings of someone with nine years of completed schooling, S ¡ 10
years of potential work experience, and the desired AFQT quartile. These foregone earnings
estimates are included in our estimates of total schooling expenditures and are reported in
Table D1 of the Appendix.
We calibrate the government subsidy rate s as follows. We assume that the private
costs of investment are foregone earnings plus a fraction of post-secondary tuition and other
direct costs. Table 333 of the Digest of Education Statistics (2003) reports that tuition and
fees accounted for 20% of total current-fund revenue for degree-granting higher education
institutions in 1980. Assuming a ratio of 0:20 for private to total direct expenditures for
college, the subsidy rates for investment education beyond ipub range from 0:47 to 0:6 for
completed schooling levels 12{16 depending on the AFQT quartile and completed years of
schooling. As our baseline, we use a subsidy rate of 54% (i.e. s = 1:19) based on the average
government subsidy rate for individuals completing 2 years of college; however, our results
are very similar when we use other reasonable values.
We estimate the parameters g and ® of the earnings equation using data from the
NLSY79. From the model, the wage earnings of someone with ability a who invested h
and has been working ¿ periods is y(~ a;h;¿) = ~ ah®eg¿ where ~ a ´ a=¹. This is log-linear, so
we regress log earnings for individual i on AFQT quartile indicators (Ai), estimated total
schooling expenditures (hi) as reported in Table D1, and years of experience (¿ = age¡24):
ln[yi¿] = ¯
0
0Ai + ¯1ln(hi) + ¯2¿ + ºi¿;
where ºi¿ is a mean zero idiosyncratic earnings shock, i.e. E(ºi¿jAi;hi;¿) = 0. The implied
estimates for ® and g are, respectively, ^ ® = ^ ¯1 and ^ g = 8^ ¯2 (recall that a unit time interval in
the model corresponds to 8 years in the data.) Even though ºi¿ is mean zero, E[eºi¿] > 1, so
we adjust the coe±cient vector ^ ¯0q on AFQT quartiles using the sample average e^ ºi¿. That
is, our ability estimate for quartile q is ~ aq = e
^ ¯0qe^ ºi¿. These ability estimates range from
106:7 for the least able to 158:3 for the most able, suggesting that, for the same schooling,
the most able are on average about 50% more productive than are the least able.
Ideally, we would like to specify a joint distribution of wealth and ability to simulate our
model and compute the distribution of investment in the economy. Unfortunately, this is
not feasible. We do not directly observe the assets available to youth, because they not only
depend on their parents net worth and income but also on intra-family transfers, which are
not always observed. Modelling these transfers is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we
analyze investment behavior for our estimated ability types and a range of potential wealth
levels. While we cannot compare moments for investment implied by the model with those
completed schooling when they were ages 16-24 and no longer enrolled in school. Potential work experience
is measured as age - years of completed schooling - 6. The estimates (available upon request) suggest that
earnings for these young workers are generally increasing in years of completed schooling and increasing and
concave in potential work experience.
30observed in the data, we can explore whether investment is increasing in ability and wealth
over reasonable ranges of wealth, how investment behavior depends on the type of constraints
we assume, and how investment and borrowing (as functions of ability and wealth) respond
to changes in the economy.
Because foregone earnings are an important part of investment expenditures in our cal-
ibration, an individual's initial wealth, w, includes at least the amount he could earn if he
left school after grade 9 and began working. This amount depends on ability, since foregone
earnings depend on ability (see Appendix Table D1). The relevant range of initial wealth,
therefore, begins at $52,000 for the least able, $74,000 for AFQT quartile 2, and $80{84,000
for the top two quartiles. Any wealth levels above these amounts must come from parents
or other outside sources.
5.8 Baseline Simulations
We are primarily interested in the implied cross-sectional relationship between ability, wealth,
and investment in our model with both the GSL and private lenders. We begin with a
discussion of borrowing constraints in this environment and then discuss investment behavior.
Figure 5 shows a very strong result: for any value of ¾ ¸ 0, the limited commitment
model implies a positive relationship between investment and ability given our values for
° and ¼.39 The ¯gure displays the value of · (the fraction of future earnings that can
be borrowed from private lenders) associated with di®erent values of ¾ under our baseline
parameterization (thick green line) and under alternative assumptions about punishments
° and ¼. The ¯gure also displays ·(¾) as de¯ned in Proposition 6 (dashed line). When
· ¸ ·(¾), investment is increasing in ability. Notice, · exceeds ·(¾) for any value of ¾ under
our baseline parameters. This is also true if the only penalty for default is a seven-year
exclusion from ¯nancial markets (¼ = 7=8; ° = 0) or if the exclusion period lasts only one
year (¼ = 1=8) and ° = 0:1. When no penalties for default exist (i.e. ¼ = ° = 0), the limited
commitment model is equivalent to an exogenous constraint model with d0 = 0, and there
is only a positive relationship between ability and investment if 0 · ¾ < 1 (IES > 1).
As discussed earlier, both · and ·(¾) are increasing in ¾. Over most of the empirically
relevant range where ¾ > 1 (IES < 1), an increase in ¾ makes it more rather than less likely
that the condition in Proposition 6 is met and investment is increasing in ability.
Figure 6 shows the implied borrowing constraints as a function of individual investment
(not including government subsidy amounts) for the GSL program. The ¯gure also shows the
private lending constraints as a function of individual investment for all four ability groups.
While o®ering sizeable loans to students, private lenders do not o®er as much as the GSL
program over a wide range of investment amounts. At any level of investment, the di®erence
in private lending limits between the most and least able is sizeable, ranging from about
39Since the IES equals the inverse of ¾, the empirically relevant range is ¾ ¸ 1.
31Figure 5: Su±cient Condition for a positive ability-investment relationship in the L model.
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40With private lending markets alone, the most able are constrained up through initial asset levels of
around $85,000. With the GSL alone or with exogenous constraints, the most able are constrained through
initial asset levels of around $70,000. In all cases, investment is unconstrained for asset levels above potential
32Figure 6: GSL and Private Lending Constraints (Baseline Economy)
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Figure 7: Private Borrowing (Baseline Economy)










































33It is noteworthy that the investment amounts implied by the model are fairly close to
average total expenditures by AFQT quartile in the NLSY79 data, even though we did not
target these values.41 This external validity provides additional con¯dence in our model and
the baseline parameterization.
5.9 A Rise in the Costs of and Returns to Schooling
We now simulate the e®ects of an increase in the costs of and returns to schooling | two
major economic changes that took place between the early 1980s and early 2000s. We
aim to see whether the model can reproduce the observed rise in private lending as well
as the increased e®ects of family income on educational attainment. We also compare the
investment and consumption allocations under di®erent assumptions about credit markets.
This sheds light on the importance of a GSL program for investment, as well as the role
played by private lenders today. We also compare these environments with the standard
model, which assumes borrowing constraints are exogenous.
We model an increase in the wage returns to education by assuming that ® increases
by 0.02 (from the baseline estimate of 0.432). This change produces a modest increase
in the college { high school log wage di®erential. We model the rise in net tuition costs by
assuming that the government subsidy rate, s, falls from 1:19 to 1:05. This reduction re°ects
the increased importance of tuition and fees as a fraction of total current-fund revenue for
public and private universities in the U.S. Finally, we incorporate the stability of maximum
GSL loan limits by assuming that dmax remains unchanged at $35;000.
Figure 8 graphs the new private lending limits against the unchanged GSL limits. For
all investment and ability levels, private credit limits increase by at least $3,000 over the
baseline amounts, with much larger increases at higher investment amounts. This increase
is entirely driven by the increased return to investment, which raises the monetary costs of
default and, therefore, the amount students can commit to repay.
Youth wish to borrow more in response to increases in the costs and returns to investment.
With no increase in credit available from the GSL, private lenders must cover the increased
demand for credit. Indeed, Figure 9 shows that private lending increases substantially. While
the least able youth still do not borrow from private lenders, high ability youth with low
asset levels now borrow as much as $50,000.
Figure 10 shows investment behavior under the higher assumed costs and returns to
school (i.e. ® = 0:453 and s = 1:05) for the four di®erent models of credit constraints
(GSL plus private lenders, private lenders alone, GSL alone, and exogenous constraints with
d0 = dmax). First, panel (a) considers investment in our preferred model with a GSL program
school-period earnings.
41Combining the total costs by AFQT quartile and schooling level reported in Table D1 with the distri-
bution of educational attainment by AFQT in the NLSY79, we obtain average total investment amounts
ranging from $88,000 for the least able to $178,000 for the most able.
34Figure 8: `Year 2000' GSL and Private Lending Constraints
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Figure 9: Private Borrowing (`Year 2000')













































35and private lending. Investment increases noticeably relative to the baseline economy. This
increase would have been even greater if private costs had not risen as well. Borrowing
constraints now appear to be binding for a broad range of initial asset levels among the
higher ability types. Individuals in the top two ability quartiles with assets below $100,000
($15-20 thousand above potential school-period earnings) are constrained. Individuals in the
second lowest ability quartile with initial assets below $60,000 (less than potential school-
period earnings) are constrained. The least able are unconstrained for all reported levels of
wealth. Consistent with the NLSY97 data, family resources have become more important
for investment among a broader set of individuals.
Now, contemplate eliminating either source of credit. Panel (b) of Figure 10 considers
private lending alone, while panel (c) considers the GSL program alone. In both cases,
individuals from a much broader range of initial assets and abilities are constrained and
invest less than in panel (a) when both sources are present. For most initial asset and ability
levels, the private lending market and GSL yield fairly similar investment levels; however,
this is not true for those with very low initial assets (amounts below potential school-period
earnings). Under the GSL, these youth would invest the maximum amount they can borrow,
$35,000, above the publicly provided amount. Investing less does not provide them with any
more consumption while in school, since they would also be required to borrow less. Private
lenders do not impose this tight restriction, so very poor youth would invest less even though
they may be able to borrow more than under the GSL.
Notice that both models which incorporate private lending (panels a and b) imply a posi-
tive relationship between ability and investment for all levels of assets; although, investment
is quite similar across ability types for very low asset levels (below potential school-period
earnings). This is not the case for the GSL alone (panel c), since the upper limit on borrow-
ing is the binding constraint for a broad range of initial asset levels and ability types. The
perverse relationship between ability and optimal investment is even worse for the exogenous
constraint model as shown in panel (d).
Finally, we show consumption during the investment period under all four credit market
assumptions in Figure 11. Consumption is substantially higher when both the GSL and pri-
vate lending markets are available than when either is not. As expected from our discussion
of the GSL program in Section 4, consumption while in school is quite low for those with
low initial assets. The fact that borrowing cannot be used to ¯nance consumption under the
GSL can be quite costly for the poor in the absence of private lending. All other forms of
credit constraints allow for more intertemporal consumption smoothing, even if it is at the
expense of lower investment.
36Figure 10: Total Investment (`Year 2000') with Di®erent Credit Market Assumptions
(a) GSL and private lending (b) Private Lending


















































































(c) GSL (d) Exogenous borrowing limits


















































































37Figure 11: Consumption during Investment Period (`Year 2000') with Di®erent Credit Mar-
ket Assumptions
(a) GSL and private lending (b) Private Lending


























































































(c) GSL (d) Exogenous borrowing limits



























































































This paper develops a lifecycle human capital investment model that incorporates the bor-
rowing opportunities of GSL programs and private lenders who face limited commitment by
borrowers. Both types of lenders directly link credit to investment behavior, with private
lenders further linking credit to observable borrower characteristics that determine invest-
ment productivity. These links are absent in previous models and we show that they play a
central role in determining human capital investment behavior.
We draw three broad lessons. First, our model with endogenous borrowing constraints is
consistent with empirical studies in that it implies positive e®ects of both family income and
ability on schooling attainment among constrained borrowers. In contrast, under empirically
plausible assumptions, a standard exogenous constraint model predicts a negative ability {
schooling relationship for constrained borrowers. Second, the direct link between credit and
investment inherent in GSL programs breaks the tradeo® between income maximization and
consumption smoothing for some constrained borrowers. As a result, students constrained
by GSL limits from borrowing more then they invest will choose to invest the unconstrained
optimal amount. Previous empirical tests based only on educational attainment (or the
marginal returns on investment) cannot detect this constraint. Third, our model is able to
reproduce the increased e®ect of family income on college attendance, the increased fraction
of students borrowing the maximum amount from GSL programs, and the increased student
borrowing from private lenders over the last few decades as an equilibrium response to rising
college costs and returns.
It is important to consider both GSL programs and private lenders when modelling hu-
man capital investment decisions. The features of GSL programs allow for the possibility
that some student borrowers invest the optimal unconstrained amount even if they are con-
strained. For them, the existence of a private loan market allows for better smoothing of
consumption over time. The presence of private lending generates a positive relationship
between ability and investment for individuals from all income backgrounds { a robust em-
pirical pattern. The co-existence of private and public sources of credit yields some important
interactions. First and foremost, investment is higher when both sources are available than
when only one or the other exists. Our quantitative analysis suggests that many more per-
sons would be constrained in the absence of either GSL programs or a private student loan
market. We also show that private loan limits should depend positively on the better en-
forced GSL credit limits. An increase in GSL loan limits may crowd out some borrowing
from private lenders, but it will not cause private lenders to o®er less credit.
We use an analytically tractable model to show that the main features of GSL programs
and private lending under limited commitment are important for explaining observed in-
vestment patterns. An obvious next step is to introduce uncertainty about the returns to
investment. While we do not expect such an extension to alter our predictions about the
39relationship between investment, ability and family resources in any important way, incor-
porating uncertainty opens new and interesting areas of inquiry. With uncertainty about
labor market success, the option of default provides insurance against adverse outcomes.
Private lenders and governments must strike a balance between providing this insurance to
borrowers and enforcing repayment. This de¯nes an interesting optimal lending and enforce-
ment policy, which may be complicated by the fact that students possess private information
about their own abilities or willingness to study. Additionally, the existence of labor market
uncertainty generally implies default by some agents in equilibrium. This makes it possible
to study which agents are most likely to default and how economic changes and public poli-
cies a®ect default behavior. We view our framework as a natural starting point for these
types of analysis.
We also suggest that future empirical e®orts to estimate school-choice models consider
the types of endogenous constraints and punishments we emphasize here. With reliable
data on schooling, borrowing, earnings, and loan repayment (an admittedly tall order),
structural estimation may be able to identify more general punishment strategies than we
have assumed in this paper. Such an analysis would provide important new insights about
the role of borrowing constraints, who is likely to be constrained, and how higher education
policies and economic changes a®ect schooling and borrowing decisions.
40Appendices
A NLSY79 and NLSY97 Data
The NLSY79 is a random survey of American youth ages 14-21 at the beginning of 1979, while the
NLSY97 samples youth ages 12-16 at the beginning of 1997.42 Since the oldest respondents in the
NLSY97 recently turned age 24 in the 2004 wave of data, we analyze college attendance as of age
21 in both samples.
Individuals are considered to have attended college if they attended at least 13 years of school
by the age of 21.43 For the 1979 cohort, we use average family income when youth are ages 16-17,
excluding those not living with their parents at these ages. In the NLSY97 data, we use household
income and net wealth reported in 1997 (corresponding to ages 13-17), dropping individuals not
living with their parents that year.44 We use AFQT as a measure of cognitive ability. It is a
composite score from four subtests of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)
used by the U.S. military: arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, and
numerical operations. These tests are taken by respondents in both the NLSY79 and NLSY97
during their teenage years as part of the survey process. We categorize individuals according to
their family income, family net wealth (in NLSY97), and AFQT score quartiles.45
Our multivariate analysis controls for a host of family background variables. For both cohorts,
we control for maternal education by categorizing mothers as high school dropouts, those who
completed high school or more, and those who completed at least one year of college. We account
for family structure in the NLSY79 by controlling for the number of siblings the youth reported in
1979. For the NLSY97, we control for the number of household members under the age of 18 as of
the 1997 survey date. Additional family structure information is provided by an indicator variable
for whether both parents are present in the home at age 14 in the NLSY79 and in 1997 (i.e. ages
13-17) in the NLSY97. Family residence in an urban (metropolitan) area at age 14 (age 12) is
accounted for with the 1979 (1997) cohort. We control for the mother's age at birth as well as
gender and race (blacks, hispanics and whites for the NLSY79; blacks, hispanics, other non-whites,
and whites for the NLSY97 data). Finally, we allow for di®erences by year of birth.
B Proofs and Other Aspects of the Two-Period Model
B.1 The set of constrained individuals
For each ability level a, the various forms of credit constraints de¯ne a threshold wealth level below
which the agent is constrained (and above which he is not). We now characterize those thresholds.
42See Belley and Lochner (2007) for additional details on the sample and variables used in this paper.
43Schooling attainment by age 22 is used if it is missing or unavailable at age 21 (fewer than 10% of all
respondents in both surveys).
44Family income includes government transfers (e.g. welfare and unemployment insurance), but it does
not subtract taxes. Net wealth measures the value of all assets (e.g. home and other real estate, vehicles,
checking and savings, and other ¯nancial assets) less any loans and credit card debt.
45Since AFQT percentile scores increase with age in the NLSY79, we determine an individual's quartile
based on year of birth. AFQT percentile scores in the NLSY97 have already been adjusted to account for
age di®erences.
41Exogenous Constraints: The threshold wX




= d0, so it is
increasing in a. Note that wX
min (a) ¸ hU (a) ¡ d0, the wealth level needed to ¯nance hU (a) given
maximum borrowing. Consumption smoothing further implies that wX
min (a) is steeper than hU (a)














da > 0 by implicit
di®erentiation.
GSL Programs: The threshold wG
min(a) ´ maxfwX
min(a); ~ wmin(a)g, where ~ wmin(a) is de¯ned
by hU(a) = dU(a; ~ wmin(a)). It is increasing in a because dU(¢;w) is steeper than hU(¢). To see
that wX












Private Lending with Limited Commitment: The threshold wL
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GSL Programs Plus Private Lenders: The threshold wG+L
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min(a), the threshold wG+L
min (a) can be decreasing in a and may even be negative.
B.2 Proofs
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expression (6), de¯ne
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Since the denominator is greater than one, the argument is complete. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1. From the FOC de¯ne
F ´ ¡u0 (w + d0 ¡ h) + ¯af0 [h]u0 [af (h) ¡ Rd0] = 0.


















@w> 0 since @F
@w = ¡u00 (w + d0 ¡ h) > 0. Second,
@F
@a
= ¯f0 [h]u0 [af (h) ¡ Rd0]
½
1 + af (h)
u00 [af (h) ¡ Rd0]
u0 [af (h) ¡ Rd0]
¾
< ¯f0 [h]u0 [af (h) ¡ Rd0]
½
1 + [af (h) ¡ Rd0]
u00 [af (h) ¡ Rd0]
u0 [af (h) ¡ Rd0]
¾
= ¯f0 [h]u0 [af (h) ¡ Rd0]f1 ¡ 1=´ [af (h) ¡ Rd0]g,
42where the ¯rst results from direct derivation, the second from u0 > 0, u00 < 0, f0 > 0, and d0 > 0,
and the third uses the de¯nition of IES´ ´ (¢). If ´ (c) · 1 for all c > 0, then the right-hand-side
of the last line is non-positive and @F
@a < 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. Using the FOC of the exogenous constraint model,
^ a(w) ´ sup
©
^ a : u0 (w) ¸ ¯^ af0 [dmax]u0 [^ af (dmax) ¡ Rdmax]
ª
;
which in principle could be +1. If u(c) = c1¡¾=(1 ¡ ¾), then a ¯nite ^ a(w) would be given by




¾ = (^ a)
¾¡1
¾ f (dmax) ¡ Rdmax (^ a)
¡1
¾ .
If ¾ > 1 (IES < 1 ), the RHS is strictly increasing and unbounded and, hence, ^ a(w) is ¯nite. The
rest is direct upon examination of optimality conditions under the three di®erent cases. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2. Straightforward and omitted. ¥
Proof Proposition 3. The non-monotonicity of c0 (h) is driven by the Inada condition on
f (¢). For low values of h, c0 (h) is increasing since ·af0 [h] > 1, i.e. borrowing limits increase




= 1. Since · < R¡1, then hO (a) < hU (a). Obviously hL (a;w) > hO (a) as otherwise




·af0 (h) ¡ 1
¢
u0 (w + ·af (h) ¡ h) + ¯af0 (h)(1 ¡ ·R)u0 [af (h)(1 ¡ ·R)] = 0:
We ¯rst prove (i). Contrary to the hypothesis, assume that the agent is constrained and





¯R(1 ¡ ·R)u0 [c1] > ¯af0 (h)(1 ¡ ·R)u0 [c1]
=
¡
1 ¡ ·af0 (h)
¢
u0 (c0)
> (1 ¡ ·R)u0 (c0),




< R again. Hence ¯Ru0 [c1] >
u0 (c0), and the agent could not have been constrained. Part (ii) is direct from implicit deriva-
tion as in Proposition 1. We now prove (iii). From the second order condition @F=@h < 0 and
signf@h=@ag=signf@F=@ag. After some simpli¯cation:
@F
@a
= ·f0 (h)u0 (c0) +
¡






+ ¯ (1 ¡ ·R)f0 (h)
©
u0 [c1] + c1u00 [c1]
ª
:
The ¯rst two terms are always positive, while the third term can be either positive or negative.
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43where the second uses c1 = (1 ¡ ·R)af (h) and the de¯nition of ´ (¢); the IES. The last line follows
from u0 (c0)=u0 (c1) ¸ ¯R and then simplifying. Since ·c1
c0
1
´(c0) is non-negative, the condition
´ (c1) > 1 ¡ ·R implies that @F=@a > 0 which completes the proof of part (iii). Finally, we prove
(iv). If ¯R ¸ 1 then c1 ¸ c0, and with ´ (¢)is non-decreasing, then ´ (c1) ¸ ´ (c0). Therefore,
@F
@a





[1 ¡ ·(1 + R)]
¾
;
which is strictly positive if · ¸ [1 ¡ ´ (c0)]=(1 + R). ¥
Proof of Proposition 4. The ¯rst part is trivial since w < wL
min (a) implies that dU (a;w) >
dL (a;w) and, since d0 = dL (a;w), dU (a;w) > d0, which implies w < wX
min (a). To shorten
notation, we suppress the dependence of the endogenous variables on (a;w). Contrary to the
statement, assume that hL · hX. Then cX
0 = w + dX ¡ hX · w + d0 ¡ hX · w + dL ¡ hL · cL
0,











hX¤® ¡RdX ¸ a
£
hL¤® ¡RdL = cL
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< (1 ¡ ·R). The second inequality follows from the hypothesis that hL ·








. The last equality follows from the FOC of the X model.
¥
Proof of Proposition 5. The fact that hL+G (a;w;dmax) · hU (a) follows from the same
arguments as before. De¯ne F (h;dmax) as
F ´
¡
·af0 (h) ¡ 1
¢
u0 [w + dmax + ·af [h] ¡ h] + ¯af0 (h)(1 ¡ ·R)u0 [af (h)(1 ¡ ·R) ¡ Rdmax].
The ¯rst order condition that determines hL+G (a;w;dmax) is F = 0 and @hL+G (a;w;dmax)=@dmax =



















This implies that hL (a;w) = hL+G (a;w;0) < hL+G (a;w;dmax) for dmax> 0, proving (i). ¥
C Proofs and Other Aspects of the Quantitative Model
C.1 Unrestricted Allocations















=[g ¡ ½] if g 6= ½
P ¡ 1 g = ½:
Optimal out-of-pocket investment is










Since total schooling investment is given by (15), it clear that if a · a0 ´ [ipub]
1¡®
®(1+s)© , then xU (a) = 0
















C.2 Exogenous Constraint Model























Everything else is the same as in the basic model.
C.3 GSL Model
The threshold level of initial assets wG















, where dU (a;w) is given
by expression (16) and hU (a) by expression (15).
C.4 Private Lending with Limited Commitment
The highest discounted utility that can be attained by an individual that defaults at t = 1 is





















Claims about · follow directly from: (i) ^ £°;¼ < £ for °;¼ > 0; (ii) ^ £°;¼ is decreasing in °; (iii) for
all ° 2 (0;1), ^ £°;¼ converges to £ as ¼ ! 0.
As of t = 0, the maximization problem consists of choosing a consumption c0 for all t 2 [0;1],




[c0 + x] · w + e¡½d, (26)
[CC] : d · ·
£
¹¡1a©[ipub + (1 + s)x]
¤® . (27)
Aside from government subsidies (s;ipub) and the determination of £, ©, and ·, this problem is
equivalent to the two-period model of Section 4.5.
45The value wL







¤® is the threshold of wealth
























for a > a0.
Individuals with w ¸ wL
min (a) attain the unrestricted allocations. For those with w < wL
min (a),

















Proof of Proposition 6. To shorten notation de¯ne:
A ´ a©, c0 ´ e½¹w + ·Ah® ¡ x,
m1 ´ (1 ¡ ·)¹¡1Ah®, ± ´ ®Ah®¡1 (1 + s):
Optimality requires that either F < 0 and x = 0, or F = 0 and x > 0, where
F ´ [·± ¡ 1][c0]
¡¾ + £[m1]
¡¾ (1 ¡ ·)±.
We ¯rst prove part (i). If the credit constraint binds, then [c0]
¡¾ > £[m1]
¡¾. If F < 0, then
hL (a;w) = ipub, and the result is trivial. If F = 0, then [1 ¡ ·±] < (1 ¡ ·)±, implying that ± > 1.
For the unconstrained case de¯ne
cU
0 (a;w) = ¹e½w + ¹dU (a;w) ¡ xU (a),
mU


















¤¡¾, the ¯rst order condition implies that ±U (a) · 1.
Thus, ± > ±U (a) and hence hL (a;w) < hU (a). We now prove part (ii). From maximization, we
have the condition @F
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First, from the ¯rst order condition
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¡¾ ®(1 ¡ ·)Ah®¡1 (1 + s)
and then taking £[m1]
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46where we also have multiplied and divided by ¹ and used the de¯nition of m1. For constrained
individuals, we have that
[c0]¡¾
£[m1]¡¾ ¸ 1, and therefore m1
c0 ¸ £
1
¾. With these inequalities we can ¯nd




























where in the ¯rst line we have used the expressions for £ and ¹ and the second we have simpli¯ed.







C.5 GSL Programs Plus Private Lenders
The threshold level of initial assets wG+L






















where dU (a;w) is given by expression (16) and hU (a) by expression (15). Since borrowers combine
both sources of credit, wG+L







min(a) is the threshold under
private lending alone and wG
min(a) is the threshold under the GSL alone.
47Table D1: Educational Expenditures by Year of Schooling and AFQT Quartile (1999 Dollars)
Quart. 1 Quart. 2 Quart. 3 Quart. 4  Quart. 1 Quart. 2 Quart. 3 Quart. 4 
8 59,075 0000 59,075 59,075 59,075 59,075
9 65,239 0000 65,239 65,239 65,239 65,239
10 71,167 2,197 3,080 3,526 3,353 73,364 74,246 74,693 74,520
11 76,866 5,058 7,088 8,116 7,717 81,924 83,955 84,982 84,584
12 82,347 8,638 12,106 13,862 13,181 90,985 94,453 96,208 95,527
13 97,315 12,948 18,147 20,778 19,757 110,263 115,462 118,093 117,072
14 111,708 17,936 25,138 28,783 27,369 129,645 136,846 140,491 139,077
15 125,548 23,489 32,919 37,692 35,841 149,036 158,467 163,240 161,388
16 138,855 29,431 41,247 47,228 44,908 168,286 180,102 186,083 183,763
17 151,650 35,547 49,818 57,042 54,240 187,197 201,468 208,692 205,890
18 163,953 41,599 58,301 66,754 63,475 205,552 222,254 230,707 227,428
19 175,783 47,359 66,373 75,996 72,263 223,142 242,156 251,780 248,046
20 187,158 52,629 73,759 84,454 80,306 239,787 260,918 271,612 267,464
Notes:
1) Direct expenditures assume average expenditure per pupil in primary and secondary schooling through
    grade 12.  Additional expenditures for higher grades are taken from average expenditures per student
    in all colleges and universities.  Expenditures based on averages for school years 1979-80 to 1988-89.
   (Source: Tables 170 and 342, Digest of Education Statistics, 1999.)
2) Foregone earnings are calculated from regression of log(earnings) on AFQT quartile, education indicators,
    experience and experience-squared.  Foregone earnings are based on someone with 9 years of schooling
    and the corresponding level of experience.  Sample includes not enrolled youth ages 16-24.
3) Expenditures are discounted at a 4% annual interest rate to grade 10.
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